Jose O. v. Superior Court (D053699).

Court of Appeal - Fourth Appellate District - Decided 12/23/2008

Facts and Procedural History

In June 2008, Angel O. (then 3 years old) was detained by San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300(a). Police had responded to the home of Angel's parents, Jose O. and Beatriz O., to find Jose unconscious and Beatriz dead from multiple stab wounds. Angel was seated between them. Subsequently, the Agency filed an amended petition under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300(i), adding that Angel had been subjected to an act of cruelty.

The juvenile court sustained the allegations, denied Jose reunification services under Welf. & Inst. Code section 361.5(b)(6), and set a 366.26 hearing. Jose petitioned the court for review of the court's orders, contending that the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services and setting a 366.26 hearing.

Issue(s)

Does section 361.5(b)(6) of the Welfare & Institutions Code authorize denial of reunification services where the party seeking reunification caused the death of the child's other parent but no physical harm to the child occurred?

Rule(s)

Section 361.5(b)(6) of the Welfare & Institutions Code provides, in relevant part, that reunification services may be denied when:

...the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian...and the court nakes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.
[...]
A finding of the infliction of severe physical harm, for the purposes of this subdivision, may be based on, but is not limited to, deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child's body or the body of a sibling or half sibling of the child by an act or omission of the parent or guardian, or of another individual or
animal with the consent of the parent or guardian; deliberate and torturous confinement of the child, sibling, or half sibling in a closed space; or any other torturous act or omission that would be reasonably understood to cause serious emotional damage.

Analysis

After noting that the issue raised by the petitioner was solely a matter of law that did not involve any disputed set of facts, the court granted de novo review of whether the exemption of 361.5(b)(6) applied in this case. The court concluded, after a review of both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, that the intent of the legislature in enacting section 361.5 had been to grant to the juvenile court discretion not to provide reunification services where the court deemed that they would not benefit the child because one of the circumstances enumerated in 361.5(b)existed.

Looking at the plain language of the statute, the court found that the emotional harm Angel O. suffered from watching his father kill his mother was sufficient to meet the definition of "infliction of severe physical harm" as that term is defined in 361.5(b)(6) by virtue of the emotional trauma such an event would create for the child. The court found that physical injury is not required for 361.5(b)(6) to apply. The court also found that, given this interpretation of 361.5(b)(6), the lower court had not clearly abused its discretion in denying reunification services.

Conclusion(s)

NO, the juvenile court did not err in denying Jose O. reunification services the basis for the denial was a claim that Welf. & Inst. Code section 361.5(b)(6) includes acts - in this case, killing the child's other parent - that result in emotional harm but no physical injury to the child.

Disposition

Jose O.'s petition for extraordinary relief was denied.

The full text of the opinion can be downloaded here: PDF, Word.

In re R.C. (D052698)

California Court of Appeals - Fourth District - 12/19/2008

Facts and Procedural History

In April, 2007, R.C. (then a one-month-old infant) was detained from his mother, Patricia, on allegations that she had used heroin while pregnant and was showing symptoms of drug exposure. R.C. was placed in foster care and reunification services, including drug treatment, psychological evaluation, counseling, and parenting classes were ordered for Patricia. Over the next six months, Patricia's whereabouts were unknown and she failed to comply with many of the services required by the Social Services Agency.

At the six-month review hearing, the court terminated services and set a 366.26 hearing. Patricia filed a section 388 petition, requesting that the court place R.C. with her or order additional reunification services. Patricia alleged that she had completed programs while incarcerated in Virginia, and further argued that such orders would be in R.C.'s best interests because they'd allow her to continue bonding with her child. The court denied the petition, finding Patricia did not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or best interests.

At a contested 366.26 hearing, Patricia testified that she was willing to do whatever was necessary to have R.C. back in her life, and that she participated in various programs while incarcerated in Virginia. She asked the court to order a permanent plan other than adoption. The Social Services Agency recommended that adoption be selected as the permanent plan, and found that they had 43 identified pre-adoptive homes who would be able to accept placement of R.C. The court found that R.C. was likely to be adopted and none of the circumstances of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied to preclude terminating parental rights.

Patricia appealed the summary dismissal of her section 388 petition, contending a due process violation and alleging that she had in fact made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed modification was in R.C.'s best interests. She further challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Department's finding of adoptability, and challenged the Department's evidence that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26 does not apply in this case.

Issue(s)

1. Did the juvenile court err in dismissing Patricia's section 388 petition without a hearing?
2. Did the Foster Family Agency present sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that R.C. is adoptable?
3. Did the juvenile court err in finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply to the facts of this case?

Rule(s)

"[I]f the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing.'However, if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition...[t]he prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition." (In re Jasmon O (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806)

Analysis

The court noted that Patricia produced certificates showing that she had completed two programs while incarcerated in Virginia. However, the court stated that "Patricia's participation in these programs, while commendable, did not show her circumstances had changed sufficiently to warrant returning R.C. to her care or delaying permanency for him by offering her further services." Significantly, the court observed, Patricia had made no prima facie showing that she had successfully addressed her chronic substance abuse issue, which was the precipitating issue that led to R.C.'s detention.

The court further noted that, even had Patricia met the prima facie burden of showing changed circumstances, she did not show that modification of the court's orders was in R.C.'s best interests. The court noted that R.C. had been in a stable placement for a prolonged period of time, and cited the earlier precedent of In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (holding that following termination of parental rights "the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability...and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child.")

The court rejected Patricia's challenge to R.C.'s adoptability, finding that substantial evidence exists that R.C. is adoptable, and that the possibility of future complications related to his in utero exposure to heroin does not preclude a finding of adoptability. In fact, as the court noted, R.C.'s caretakers are aware of his condition and nevertheless remain fully committed to adopting him. From this, a reasonable inference can be drawn that he is adoptable.

The court stated that, in order to support her contention that beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies here, Patricia needed to show "he or she has a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment from child to parent." In this case, the court found that Patricia "had regular and frequent supervised visits with R.C. during the first three months of his dependency. She then stopped visiting R.C. and moved to Virginia." This fact, combined with her substance abuse, failure to participate in court-ordered services and incarceration, prevented her from having a parental role in R.C.'s life. As such, the court held that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply.

Conclusion(s)

1. NO, the juvenile court did not err in dismissing Patricia's section 388 petition without a hearing, because Patricia failed to show that there existed changed circumstances, and failed to show that modification of the court's orders was sufficiently in R.C.'s best interests to justify disrupting a stable, long-term placement.
2. YES, the Foster Family Agency presented sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that R.C. is adoptable because R.C.'s current caregivers stand ready to adopt him knowing his potential future issues, and therefore it is likely other adoptive parents could also be found.
3. NO, the juvenile court did not err in finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply here, because Patricia has failed to maintain ongoing visitation and failed to complete services necessary to address her chronic substance abuse issues.

Disposition

Patricia's challenges were denied, and the lower court's decision was affirmed.

The full text of the opinion can be downloaded here: PDF, Word.